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THE HIV STIGMA: DUTY OR DEFENCE? 
Kate Harker and Ellen Wright* 
 
Abstract: This article will outline and analyse the current stance of  English criminal law 
regarding  the  transmission  of  HIV.  The  issues  that  surround  consent,  particularly  in 
circumstances  involving  HIV,  will  be  examined  in  conjunction  with  the  defence  of 
‘reasonable precautions’ with a particular focus on condom use and antiretroviral therapy. 
Attention will be paid to the contribution of case law and the various circumstances which 
may fall within this realm in order to gain insight into the social and personal difficulties that 
the virus presents both infected and uninfected parties. The paternalistic nature of the current 
legal approach to HIV sufferers will be critiqued and finger-pointing at vulnerable infected 
parties will be analysed, with a view to exploring alternative possibilities which value dignity 
and equality over self-preservation. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In English law, criminal prosecution is possible when an individual transmits HIV to another 
person through unprotected sexual  intercourse.  Cases  deemed appropriate for prosecution 
will  likely  proceed  under  s  20  of  the  Offences  Against  the  Person  Act  1861,1 upon the 
presumption that the defendant has recklessly transmitted the virus to an unsuspecting victim. 
However, if the victim has consented to sexual intercourse, with full knowledge of the 
defendant’s  HIV  status,  the  defendant  will  be  afforded  the  defence  of  consent  and  his2 
liability will be negated. At present, informed consent offers the only known defence to the 
sexual transmission of HIV, which places a heavy burden on carriers of the virus to disclose 
their status before engaging in intercourse. This paper argues that the duty to forewarn others 
is unnecessarily harsh, as it forces HIV sufferers either to abstain from sexual activity or to 
disclose their status to all potential partners. Consent to the risk of transmission should not be 
the  only  defence  available.  A  defendant  should  not  be  answerable  where  he  has  taken 
reasonable precautions to reduce the risk of transmission, through the proper use of condoms, 
or where he has a low or undetectable viral load. 
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would like to thank Sarah Fuhrman for her constructive advice and invaluable assistance through the editing 
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1 The Offences Against the Person Act 1861(Offences Against the Person Act) s 20. A prosecution under s 18 is 
also possible for the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm (GBH). However, the burden of proof for this 
crime is extremely high, so prosecutors are unlikely to rely on this section. 
2 To avoid confusion, the authors will refer to the defendant as male and to the victim as female. Their 
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It seems inevitable that at some point a defendant will raise the issues of condom use 
and viral load. Nevertheless, until this happens, the common law cannot develop, and HIV 
carriers  are  left  with  great  uncertainty.  Rather  than  waiting  for  the  courts  to  formulate 
additional defences to the criminal transmission of HIV, a statutory defence of reasonable 
precautions should be created that erases any doubts that the courts or HIV sufferers may 
have.3 Though a defence is preferable, the use of reasonable precautions to negate the 
defendant’s recklessness will also be discussed. This is a real reform possibility; in fact, a 
recent scoping paper by the Law Commission examines the legal effect of precautionary 
measures on a defendant’s recklessness.4 
This  article  will  begin  with  an  overview  of  the  current  state  of  the  law.  The 
development of the consent defence will be outlined, and attempts to redefine the parameters 
of the defence will be discussed. The article will then turn to the proposed solution to the 
problem: a defence of reasonable precautions that would absolve the defendant of liability for 
non-disclosure where they had taken precautionary measures to substantially lower the risk to 
the victim. The use of precautionary measures to negate the defendant’s recklessness will also 
be discussed. 
 
B.  CRIMINALISING NON-DISCLOSURE 
At present, HIV sufferers are in a state of limbo, as the courts have not yet specified when a 
sufferer must disclose their status to a sexual partner before engaging in intercourse.5 The 
contested cases that have arisen so far have not touched upon all of the issues that could bear 
on a defendant’s liability. R v Dica6 and R v Konzani7 both involved defendants who had 
engaged in high-risk sexual activity8 and, perhaps more importantly, who did not question the 
allegation that they had acted recklessly in doing so. 9 Understandably then, there was no 
discussion in either case of the nature of the risk taken or how reasonable that risk was. 
                                                 
3 A reasonable precautions defence has been discussed by others, although not in the same ways: David Hughes, 
‘Condom Use, Viral Load and the Type of Sexual Activity as Defences to the Sexual Transmission of HIV’ 
(2013) 77 Journal of Criminal Law 136; KJM Smith, ‘Sexual Etiquette, Public Interest and the Criminal Law’ 
(1991) 42 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 309, 328. 
4 See Law Commission, Reform of Offences Against the Person: A Scoping Consultation Paper  (Law Com CP 
No 217, 2014), 6.25-6.30. 
5 Note that a person cannot be liable in English law for merely exposing someone to the risk of  infection with 
HIV. Therefore, any reference to liability for non-disclosure means only those cases where there has been actual 
transmission. 
6 [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, [2004] All ER 45. 
7 [2005] EWCA Crim 706, [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 14. 
8 ie unprotected penetrative sexual intercourse. Dica (n 6) 11; Konzani (n 7) 3-4. 
9 Dica (n 6) 11; Konzani (n 7) 3-4. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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Consent by a sexual partner to run the risk of infection with HIV provides a defence, 
but in almost all circumstances, it appears that this requires disclosure by the HIV positive 
person of his status. Placing the duty to disclose on the defendant ignores situations where the 
victim might  have learned of the risk of HIV transmission from  a source other than the 
defendant, and ignores the risk inherent in certain relationships. The issues surrounding the 
defence of consent will be considered before the discussion turns to the idea of reasonable 
precautions as a defence to the transmission of HIV. 
1.  Consent in the courts: the doctrine as it relates to the transmission of HIV 
Consent by a sexual partner to the risk of infection with HIV provides a defence to a charge 
of recklessly transmitting the virus. The issue first arose in Dica. In that case, the defendant 
had  unprotected  sexual  intercourse  with  two  different  women  who  were  subsequently 
diagnosed as being HIV positive.10 At first instance, the trial judge ruled that the jury could 
convict the defendant even if he was able to show that the complainants were aware of his 
condition.11 Judge Philpot considered himself bound by the decision of the House of Lords in 
R v Brown, which found that consent is not a defence to the infliction of actual bodily harm 
unless the case falls within one of the recognised exceptions.12 Given that it was not possible 
to bring HIV transmission within any of those exceptions, Judge Philpot held that it was not 
possible, as a matter of law, to consent to the risk of infection with HIV.13 
The Court of Appeal disagreed, recognising a fundamental difference between a 
deliberate harming and the deliberate taking of risk s that result in harm. 14 The Court was 
clearly intent on highlighting the different motivations of the defendants in  Brown and in 
Dica. In Brown, the parties indulged in serious violence solely for sexual gratification.15 In 
Dica, the parties were not intent on any kind of self-harm through sexual intercourse, but 
were ‘simply prepared, knowingly, to run the risk – not the certainty – of infection, as well as 
all the other risks inherent in and possible consequences of sexual intercourse, such as, and 
despite the most careful precautions, an unintended pregnancy’.16 In other words, the Court 
understood that such risks  have always existed and that to  criminalise  HIV transmission 
                                                 
10 Dica (n 6) 3-8. 
11 ibid 13. 
12 See [1994] 1 AC 212 (HL), 231, 235, 245, 246. 
13 Dica (n 6) 13. 
14 As summarised by Matthew Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’ (2005) 68 
Modern Law Review 121 at 124. 
15 Brown (n 12) 231. 
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would  ‘mark  it  out  for  special  treatment’.17 The  Court  of  Appeal  therefore  decided  that, 
whilst consent would not be available to intentional transmissions of the virus, it would be 
available to reckless transmissions, where there was consent to that risk from the defendant’s 
partner. 
However, the Court firmly stated that consent to sexual intercourse was not consent to 
the risk of sexually transmitted diseases.18 Thus, the Court suggested that there could be a 
successful prosecution where a person, knowing that he was suffering from HIV (or some 
other serious sexual disease), recklessly transmitted the virus to a sexual partner from whom 
the risk was ‘concealed’ and not consented to.19 Consequently, the suggestion in Dica was 
that  the  deliberate  failure  to  disclose  one’s  status  prior  to  intercourse  would  negate  the 
possibility of legitimate and transformative consent.20 
In Konzani, first heard just ten days after the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Dica, it 
was confirmed that the touchstone of consent is conscious and willing consent to the risk of 
becoming  infected  with  HIV.21 However, where the  Court in  Dica  talked  of  the  risk  of 
infection with HIV as one of a number of risks involved in sexual intercourse,22 the Court in 
Konzani  appeared  keen  to  elevate  this  risk  above  other  less  probable  or  serious  risks 
associated with intercourse. Judge LJ stressed that: ‘[t]here is a critical distinction between 
taking a risk of the various, potentially adverse and possibly problematic consequences of 
sexual  intercourse,  and  giving  an  informed  consent  to  the  risk  of  infection  with  a  fatal 
disease’.23 The Court thus established that for the defence to apply, the defendant must make 
full disclosure of his status to the complainant, who must consent not only to the sexual 
activity but also to the risk of transmission of HIV.24 
This review of the case authority reveals the duty of disclosure placed on sufferers of 
the disease. It is an affirmative duty to disclose one’s status in all circumstances, regardless of 
what the victim might know about the defendant, and regardless of the type of relationship 
between the parties. As will be shown, this is too restrictive a reading of consent. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Vanessa  E  Munro,  ‘On  Responsible  Relationships  and  Irresponsible  Sex  –  Criminalising  the  Reckless 
Transmission of HIV: R v Dica and R v Konzani’ (2007) 19 Child and Family Law Quarterly 112, 114. 
18 Dica (n 6) 59 (Judge LJ). 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. 
21 Konzani (n 7) 41-42. 
22 The Court also discussed other sexually communicable infections, such as syphilis. See Dica (n 6) 2. 
23 Konzani (n 7) 41. 
24 ibid. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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2.  The defendant as discloser 
Konzani has been noted for the emphasis it places on the behaviour of the defendant.25 The 
victim’s knowledge is assessed indirectly, through an examination of the defendant’s non-
disclosure, rather than by considering what the victim actually knew about the defendant’s 
condition.26 This overlooks the other ways in which the victim may have learned of the 
defendant’s illness. It assumes that the only way for the victim to gain knowledge of their 
partner’s illness is from their partner, when this is but one of a number of possible sources. 
For example, one of the defendant’s family members may have told the victim about the 
defendant’s condition. Is the defendant unable to avail himself of the defence of consent in 
those circumstances? Similarly, what if the complainant knows that one of the defendant’s 
previous  long-term  sexual  partners  is  HIV  positive?  Has  the  victim  not  accepted  and 
consented, albeit implicitly, to the risk of infection with HIV? Surely, Weait is right that: 
where a person consents to sexual intercourse with knowledge of these facts, and 
becomes infected, the defence should be available because in each of these cases that 
person [is] aware of the risk of transmission. They may be ignorant of a partner’s HIV 
positive status in the sense that this has not been disclosed to them by him, but to deny 
the defence if there is in fact knowledge of the risk, and a willingness to accept it, 
would be tantamount to saying that the person infected bears no responsibility for 
their own sexual and physical health.27 
The courts seem to struggle with this idea. In  Konzani, Judge LJ accepted that an 
honest  belief  in  consent  without  disclosure  could  provide  a  defence,  but  then  noted  that 
‘[s]ilence in these circumstances [where an individual knows they are infected and does not 
make their partner aware of this] is incongruous with honesty, or with a genuine belief that 
there  is  an  informed  consent’.28 He  concluded  that  in  most  cases  it  would  be  ‘wholly 
artificial’  to  assert  an  honest  belief  in  consent  in  the  absence  of  disclosure. 29 This  is 
reinforced by the Court’s discussion of the limited circumstances in which informed consent 
(or an honest belief in it) would be possible without the defendant’s disclosure: 
By way of example, an individual with HIV may develop a sexual relationship with 
someone  who  knew  him  while  he  was  in  hospital,  receiving  treatment  for  the 
condition. If so, her informed consent, if it were indeed informed, would remain a 
                                                 
25 Munro (n 17) 117. 
26 ibid. 
27 Matthew Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV:  R v Dica’ (2005) 68 Modern Law 
Review 121, 128. 
28 Konzani (n 7) 44, 42. 
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defence, to be disproved by the prosecution, even if the defendant had not personally 
informed her of his condition. Even if she did not in fact consent, this example would 
illustrate the basis for an argument that he honestly believed in her informed consent. 
Alternatively, he may honestly believe that his new sexual partner was told of his 
condition by someone known to them both.30 
Thus,  the  courts  largely  preclude  the  possibility  of  informed  consent  without 
disclosure.31 Moreover, they suggest that even where a person understands that a non -
disclosing sexual partner may be HIV positive (eg because of his prior history of intravenous 
drug use), such understanding will not provide the defendant with a defence. 32 From this 
reading of the case law, it appears that the courts have not recognised the questionable nature 
of criminalising those who transmit the disease, where the uninfected party is, even without 
disclosure, well aware of the risk she is exposing herself to. 
3.  Treating relationships equally 
As explained above, the doctrine of consent is strictly applied in criminal transmission cases. 
Not only must the defendant disclose their condition to the victim, regardless of the victim’s 
knowledge, but the defendant must also discharge this duty regardless of their relationship 
with the victim. Some have suggested that the nature of the relationship bears on what the 
uninfected partner can be deemed to have consented to.33 Spencer suggests that the risk of 
contracting sexually transmissible diseases is something that ‘comes with the territory’ when 
a person engages in ‘casual or commercial sex’.34 In other words, the risk should be deemed 
to have been consented to simply by virtue of consenting to sex. He sees a difference in the 
type of consent required, however, where the relationship is affectionate and lasting.35 Then, 
it is increasingly unlikely that the uninfected partner suspects a heightened risk of infection. 
The  Court  of  Appeal  in  Dica  acknowledged  Spencer’s  commentary,  and  in  doing  so, 
highlighted the extreme differences that can exist in the relationships between parties.36 Judge 
LJ drew particular attention to the fact that: 
At one extreme there is casual sex between complete strangers, sometimes protected, 
sometimes not, when the atte ndant risks are known to be higher, and at the other, 
                                                 
30 ibid 44 (Judge LJ). 
31 See Matthew Weait, ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 763, 
767. He has rightly observed that, in both of the hypotheticals that the Court gives, there has, in effect, been 
disclosure anyway, albeit through context or through a third party. 
32 ibid 768. 
33 JR Spencer, ‘Liability for Reckless Infection – Part 2’ (2004) 154 New Law Journal 448. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 Dica (n 6) 15, 47-50. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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there is sexual intercourse between couples in a long-term and loving, and trusting 
relationship, which may from time to time also carry risks.37 
The Court went on to highlight two very different instanc es where a committed 
relationship might still carry a risk of harm: First, a Roman Catholic couple who are unable to 
use artificial contraception on religious grounds, despite the fact that one of them is infected 
with HIV; second, a young couple, desperat e for a family, who know that pregnancy will 
threaten  the  woman’s  life. 38 What  these  hypotheticals  mean  for  defendants  in  criminal 
transmission cases has been much debated. Weait argues that the Court concluded that the 
type of relationship between partners is immaterial because there is a ‘ubiquity of risk-taking 
by  couples’.39 Munro  questions  this.40 She contends that the Court simply believes that 
participants in casual sexual relationships should be deemed to have consented to those risks 
along with intercourse.41 In her opinion, 42 this  fits  better  with  Judge  LJ’s  statement  that, 
‘given the long-term nature of the relationships, if the defendant concealed the truth about his 
condition from them, and therefore kept them in ignorance of it, there was no reason for them 
to think that they were running any risk of infection, and they were not consenting to it’.43 
Such a reading would suggest that the Court is open to a distinction in the type of disclosure 
necessary based on the relationship between the parties. 
Unfortunately,  this  suggestion  was  foreclosed  by  the  decision  in  Konzani.44 That 
judgment insisted on conscious and willing consent to the specific risk of infection with HIV 
made after disclosure by the defendant. Consequently, the indication is that consent will not 
be presumed where the relationship  is  of a  casual  nature. This  is  regrettable. Where the 
parties are engaged in a high-risk sexual exchange, courts should be more alert to the risks 
that the parties are taking, and relax their strict application of consent. 
4.  Concluding thoughts 
Despite  the  courts’  consideration  of  other  factors,  strict  consent  is  the  only  currently 
recognised defence to the criminal transmission of HIV. To avail himself of the defence, the 
                                                 
37 ibid 47. 
38 ibid 49 (Judge LJ). 
39 Weait (n 31) 132. 
40 Munro (n 17) 120. 
41 ibid. 
42 ibid 120-121. 
43 Dica (n 6) 39. 
44 Konzani  (n  7)  41-42.  Munro  argues  that  there  could  still  be  a  lingering  relevance  to  the  nature  of  the 
relationships involved. In particular, she argues that it may have been influential on the court’s reasoning in 
Konzani that the intercourse in question took place in the context of more than casual relationships and with 
women who might be thought to be more trusting of the defendant within those relationships (a 15 year old 
virgin, a woman the defendant met at bible class and a woman with a very ill son). See Munro (n 17) 121. The HIV Stigma: Duty or Defence? 
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defendant must have disclosed his status and received in response an informed consent to the 
risk of infection with HIV. This translates as an almost absolute duty to forewarn. 
Many would agree with this approach. Erin and Harris, staunch supporters of bodily integrity, 
take the unwavering stance that one has an absolute duty to inform all sexual partners of 
one’s status.45 Their claim is based on the high regard society has for personal autonomy and 
for informed consent,  and on the logic that disclosing one’s illness to  a potential sexual 
partner is the surest means of allowing that partner to enter the relationship after having made 
an informed, autonomous choice as to whether to run the risk of infection. The Court of 
Appeal made this same argument in Konzani: 
If an individual who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus conceals this stark 
fact from his sexual partner, the principle of her personal autonomy is not enhanced if 
he is exculpated when he recklessly transmits the HIV virus to her through consensual 
sexual  intercourse.  On  any  view,  the  concealment  of  this  fact  from  her  almost 
inevitably means that she is deceived. Her consent is not properly informed, and she 
cannot give an informed consent to something of which she is ignorant.46 
Though these are understandable concerns, the duty to  disclose is too restrictive an 
approach. First, by placing the onus on the defendant to inform the victim, the victim is 
absolved  of liability  for their  own sexual  health.  This  approach  ignores  the conscious 
advertence to the risk by the complainant, and  thus enforces the message that people do not 
need to be responsible for their own sexual health because it is the responsibility of those 
with serious sexual diseases to disclose their status. Insofar as meeting public health aims and 
maintenance of bodily integrity are concerned, it seems a far greater priority to insist on some 
notion of shared responsibility. Second, the duty to forewarn places a burden on the infected 
party. It ignores the stigma attached to those carrying the virus and assumes that it  would be 
easy to forewarn a partner  – potentially a loved one – who would end the relationship as a 
result.47 Though it is morally preferable for an HIV sufferer to make a full disclosure, the law 
should reflect the difficulty inherent in disclosing one’s status, and thus should not insist on 
absolute disclosure or total abstinence. By adopting such a harsh stance, the law is reinforcing 
the stigma attached to the disease and adding to the burden of its sufferers. 
                                                 
45 See generally Charles A Erin and John Harris, ‘Is There an Ethics of Heterosexual AIDS?’ in L Sherr (ed), 
AIDS and the Heterosexual Population (Harwood 1993); Charles A Erin and John Harris, ‘AIDS: Ethics, Justice 
and Social Policy’ (1993) 10 Journal of Applied Philosophy 165, 165-173. 
46 Konzani (n 7) 42 (Judge LJ). 
47 ‘HIV & AIDS Stigma and Discrimination’ (Avert, 2 December 2014) <http://www.avert.org/hiv-aids-stigma-
and-discrimination.htm> accessed 28 January 2015. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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With these considerations in mind, a rethink is in order. Where a victim has either 
knowledge of the risk from a source other than the defendant, or where the relationship is a 
‘casual or commercial’ one,48 the law should recognise that there has been consent to the risk 
of HIV transmission. The authors recognise however, that even a broader reading of consent 
would not adequately protect defendants in all cases. For this reason, a defence of reasonable 
precautions ought to be examined. 
 
C.  A DEFENCE OF REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS 
The previous sections have shown that the strictly applied defence of consent is too restrictive 
and fails to take into account factors like the victim’s knowledge of the defendant’s condition 
and the relationship between the partners. In addition to relaxing the definition of consent, 
two other measures could be taken. First, the defendant’s use of reasonable precautions could 
be treated as negating his recklessness (an essential element of the charge). Second, the use of 
reasonable precautions could be treated as a complete defence to the defendant’s liability. 
‘Reasonable  precautions’  means  that  the  defendant  endeavoured  to  minimise  the  risk  of 
transmission through the use of condoms or having a low viral load. As these measures can 
reduce the risk significantly, there would no longer be a need for disclosure. 
Some commentators have proposed that another reasonable precaution be recognised: 
the type of sexual activity.49 According to these scholars, certain types of sexual activity are 
lower risk, and a defendant’s conscious effort to engage only in those activities should be 
recognised as the equivalent of condom use or a low viral load. Although the likelihood of 
transmission may be diminished, choosing to engage only in certain sexual activities does not 
provide the same benefits to the victim as condom use. Condoms are widely available and, 
short of abstaining, are the best known means of preventing infection. Moreover, part of the 
allure of a reasonable precautions defence is that it encourages individuals with HIV to use 
condoms consistently and others to insist on the use of these. This has obvious public health 
benefits that the sexual activity argument does not. 
Similar arguments could be made regarding antiretroviral therapy and the subsequent 
lowering of a defendant’s viral load. In cases where a defendant is seeking to rely on his low 
viral load, the risk may be close to zero, whereas in cases of low-risk sexual activity the risk 
                                                 
48 Spencer (n 33). 
49 See as an example Hughes (n 3) 141-143; cf Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The 
Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 176. The HIV Stigma: Duty or Defence? 
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will rarely be anywhere close to that.50 Furthermore, those claiming a low viral load as a 
reasonable precaution would be doing so in reliance on medical evidence as to the reduced 
risk of transmission. The close connection between doctor and patient that this would 
necessitate, and the adherence to an antiretroviral regime, would also further public he alth 
goals. 
For all of these reasons, type of sexual activity as a reasonable precaution will not be 
discussed.  Instead,  the  authors  will  outline  the  current  legal  effect  of  the  reasonable 
precautions of condom use and low viral load in the UK, and will then explore them as a way 
to negate recklessness, and as a defence. Understandably, many of the reasons that support a 
negation of recklessness will also support a defence, and vice versa. Therefore, the discussion 
of the defence will focus more on why a defence is preferable to a negation of recklessness, 
and what that statutory defence could look like. 
1.  The legal position in the UK 
Thus  far,  there  has  been  no  confirmation  from  the  courts  on  whether  the  proper  use  of 
precautionary measures will preclude a conviction, but there have been obiter comments that 
indicate the courts’ willingness to consider the use of those measures. In  Dica, Judge LJ 
noted that ‘If protective measures had been taken by the appellant that would have provided 
material relevant to the jury’s decision whether in all the circumstances recklessness was 
proved’.51 If  Judge  LJ  was  saying  that  a  defendant  who  used  precautions  would  not  be 
reckless (and therefore criminally liable), this would strongly support the idea of reasonable 
precautions as a defence. However, it is more likely that the judge meant that this would be 
one of a number of factors the jury could take into account when determining the defendant’s 
recklessness.52 
Konzani  adds  little  clarification.  In  that  case,  no  distinction  was  made  between 
protected and unprotected intercourse. In fact, the Court avoided any discussion of the effect 
of prophylactic measures on a defendant’s liability. This leaves sufferers uncertain as to when 
they might incur liability, and also leaves open the possibility that liability would attach to 
responsible sufferers who conscientiously use prophylactics to reduce their partner’s risk of 
                                                 
50 An  undetectable  viral  load  (for  at  least  six  months),  combined  with  the  absence  of  another  sexually 
communicable infection will mean that the disease cannot be transmitted, providing the individual complies 
with his antiretroviral treatment. Pietro Vernazza and others, ‘HIV-positive Individuals Not Suffering from Any 
Other STD and Adhering to an Effective Antiretroviral Treatment Do Not Transmit HIV Sexually’ (2008) 89 
Bulletin des Médecins Suisses 165. 
51 Dica (n 6) 11. 
52 Samantha Ryan, ‘Risk-taking, Recklessness and HIV Transmission: Accommodating the Reality of Sexual 
Transmission of HIV within a Justifiable Approach to Criminal Liability’ (2007) 28 Liverpool Law Review 215, 
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infection. As Ryan notes, there is a danger that prosecutors may treat condom use as evidence 
that a defendant realised there was a risk of transmission, or a risk of infection despite the use 
of  prophylactics.53 In  this  manner,  precautionary  measures  could  be  used  to  establish  a 
defendant’s  liability,  rather  than  to  negate  it. 54 Ultimately,  it  is  doubtful  whether  such 
arguments would be accepted. By its very nature, the act of safe sex challenges a finding of 
criminal recklessness. 
The  Crown  Prosecution  Service  (CPS)  acknowledged  that  condom  use  might  bar 
prosecution,  as  evidence  that  the  defendant  took  precautions  would  make  it  difficult  to 
establish recklessness.55 As to a low viral load, the CPS recognised that this might be as 
effective as condom use in lowering the risk of transmission.56 It would be easy to take this 
recognition as evidence that the CPS would treat reliance on a low viral load the same way it 
treats the use of prophylactics, but they have not taken that step. The CPS acknowledged that 
medical  opinion  is  still  divided  on  this  issue,  and  so  has  refrained  from  making  any 
suggestions.57 The  issue  of  viral  load  has  not  been  addressed  by  the  courts,  thus  it  is 
impossible to predict what they might do if faced with a case that raised a low viral load as a 
defence. In its scoping paper, the Law Commission noted that a low viral load may reduce the 
risk of transmission, but ultimately gave no indication of what stance it would take.58 
2.  Negation of recklessness 
a)  A justifiable risk 
Recklessness  is  the  minimum  mens  rea  required  to  impose  liability  for  the  criminal 
transmission of HIV.59 To prove recklessness, the prosecutor must show that the defendant 
took  an  unjustified  risk. 60 Therefore,  recklessness  will  be  negated  if  the  risk  taken  is 
considered justifiable. According to Ryan, the factors used to determine whether a risk is 
justifiable include: the likelihood of the risk occurring, what precautions could be taken, the 
social utility of the conduct involved, and the seriousness of the risk.61 A consideration of 
these factors will show that the use of reasonable precautions should support a negation of 
recklessness. 
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The first factors to be considered are the likelihood of the risk occurring, and what 
precautions can be taken to guard against that risk. Some contended that criminal liability 
should be reserved for conduct that carries ‘a high or significant risk’ of transmission.62 All 
sexual activity, with any partner, carries some risk: accordingly, the law should only be 
concerned with ‘high-risk activity’. Though unprotected sex with an HIV sufferer is risky,63 
the use of precautions can significantly reduce the likelihood of that risk being realised. Sex 
with a condom lowers the risk of transmission from vaginal intercourse to as low as 1 in 
10,000 for a woman,64 and 1 in 20,000 for a man.65 Oral sex with a barrier presents an even 
lower risk of transmission.66 This medical evidence strongly indicates that, where precautions 
are taken, the risk of contracting HIV ought to be deemed too low for liability to attach. 
As for a defendant’s viral load, this is the greatest risk factor for HIV transmission.67 
The higher a person’s viral load, the higher the chance they will pass on the infection. This 
makes it a definite risk factor. However, precautions can be taken. A sufferer’s viral load can 
be lowered by taking antiretroviral medications, and the consistent use of these treatments 
can lower a person’s viral load to a level where it will no longer be detectable.68 In fact, the 
Swiss Federal Commission for HIV/AIDS found that, where a person fully complies with his 
antiretroviral regime and does not have any other sexually communicable diseases, after six 
months there will be no risk of transmission through sexual intercourse.69 Much like condom 
use, then, the likelihood of the risk occurring should be too low for liability to attach. 
The next consideration is that of social utility. This factor is often heavily relied on by 
the courts when determining whether a risk can be termed justifiable. Inevitably, risk taking 
is more likely to be regarded as justifiable if there is high social value attached to the relevant 
activity. There is little doubt that sexual intimacy has a high social value. As Hart observed, 
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sexual impulses form a strong part of each person’s daily life, and their suppression can 
seriously affect ‘the development or balance of the individual’s emotional life, happiness and 
personality’.70 The high regard for sexual intimacy should, therefore, be a dominant factor in 
any assessment of a defendant’s recklessness, especially when any denial of a sufferer’s right 
to engage in protected intercourse would arguably amount to an unjustifiable intrusion into an 
eminently private matter.71 Bennett, Draper and Frith emphasise the importance of this factor: 
At some point in the widespread debate about HIV transmission, we must explore the 
relative worth which is to be attached to sexual expression and sexual gratification … 
If sexual expression and gratification are extremely valuable, then some known or un-
known risk-taking may be justified with reference to the good such sex bestows on the 
individuals concerned.72 
The  above  factors  sho uld  feature  prominently  in  the  court’s  calculation  of  the 
justifiability of the risk taken, and they all suggest that the defendant’s recklessness may well 
be  negated  by  his  use  of  precautions.  However,  there  is  another  factor  to  consider:  the 
seriousness of the risk. HIV is an incurable disease that may eventually result in AIDS, and 
even death. This cannot be ignored and, more often than not, this consideration sways those 
who  consider  this  dilemma.  Reality,  however,  is  very  much  at  odds  with  the  hysteria 
surrounding the disease. HIV is not the death sentence it was thirty years ago. There have 
been profound advancements in medicine since HIV was discovered, and treatment options 
have evolved. Indeed, research reveals that those who react well to antiretroviral therapy now 
have  the  same  mortality  rates  as  those  in  the  general  population.73 This shows that the 
seriousness of the risk of infection with HIV has been overestimated, and this has profound 
effects on defendants in criminal transmission cases. As Ryan observes, if HIV continues to 
be treated as a death sentence, then it will be impossible to argue that running the risk of 
transmission is ever justified.74 
b)  Legal precedent 
In this case of public health versus individual freedoms, it is uncertain exactly which way the 
courts would lean if the issue ever reached them. However, there is legal precedent, albeit 
from another jurisdiction, that the careful use of condoms may lower the risk below the 
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threshold for criminal responsibility. In R v Cuerrier,75 the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the failure to disclose one’s HIV positive status to a sexual partner could constitute fraud, 
which would vitiate consent to sexual activity if there was ‘a significant risk of serious bodily 
harm’ to the victim.76 Despite this, Justice Cory found that the proper use of condoms could 
reduce the level of the risk taken, such that it would no longer be deemed significant. 
Speaking for the majority, he stated that: 
To have intercourse with a person who is HIV -positive will always present risks. 
Absolutely safe sex may be impossible. Yet the careful use of condoms might be found 
to so reduce the risk of harm that it could no longer be considered significant…77 
The  effect  of  these  comments  was  mixed.  Some  courts  endorsed  them  wholeheartedly,78 
whereas  others  were  indifferent  to  them,  and  paid  no  attention  to  the  accused’s  use  of 
precautions.79 As a result, the legal effect of condom use in Canada was uncertain for several 
years. 
Around the same time, the Canadian courts were dealing with the legal effect of a low 
viral load. In R v DC,80 the court found that a defendant with an undetectable viral load was 
not required to disclose their status to a partner because the level of risk of harm was not 
significant enough.81 Though that decision was limited to those with undetectable levels, 
other cases suggested that a significant risk of harm could not be proved with a low viral load 
either.82 It seemed that Canadian courts were indicating that viral loads, on their own, would 
be important to any assessment of risk. 
R v Mabior83 resolved any uncertainties around the legal effect of condom use or viral 
loads.  It  stated that the risk of harm could  be reduced by the defendant’s proper use of 
condoms,  but  only  where  the  accused’s  viral  load  was  also  very  low  or  undetectable.84 
Therefore, under the Canadian approach a defendant must now use a condom and have a low 
viral load. This is despite the fact that the statistical probability of transmission where there is 
a low viral load or the use of protective measures reveals that the two can operate in isolation. 
However, these cases still show that a precedent for recognising the use of precautions as 
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lowering the level of risk exists, and show how statistics on transmission may eventually 
sway the courts in the UK. 
Ultimately,  any  discussion  of  whether  the  courts  would  recognise  reasonable 
precautions  as  negating  mens  rea  is  purely  speculative.  Though  the  authors  feel  that  the 
factors affecting the justifiability of risk are more than met, it cannot be denied that the courts 
may feel differently. They may continue to promote public health by punishing the sexual 
activity of HIV sufferers, or they may choose to reward the efforts of those sufferers, and 
acknowledge the difficulties that they face. 
3.  A Statutory defence 
The authors have argued that the best way forward is the creation of a defence of reasonable 
precautions. This is true for a number of reasons, particularly because of the clear lines that it 
will provide to defendants and to the courts, and because of the public health benefits it will 
inspire. Recognising reasonable precautions as a defence, as opposed to as a negation of 
recklessness, would more clearly convey to sufferers the scope of their legal duty to others. 
With  suitable  education,  sufferers  would  know  that  taking  reasonable  precautions  would 
afford them a defence to a charge of recklessly transmitting the virus. If the development of 
precautionary measures as negating recklessness were left to the courts, not only would it 
take a long time to develop, but it would likely be an uncertain development. This piecemeal 
approach is visible in the case development in Canada. In the period leading up to Mabior, 
uncertainty over the legal effect of reasonable precautions prevailed. This uncertainty should 
be avoided, as recognising reasonable precautions is meant to leave suffers in no doubt as to 
their legal obligations to others. 
Similarly, the creation of a defence would remove any of the courts’ uncertainties. A 
recognised defence would negate the need for the courts to consider conflicting statistics on 
the exact level of risk where condoms have been used, and whether this lowers the risk 
enough to negate a finding of recklessness. With a recognised defence, the decision would 
already have been made by the legislature. Canadian jurisprudence highlights this difficulty. 
As  regards  viral  loads,  the  courts  first  indicated  that  an  undetectable  viral  load  would 
eliminate  the  need  for  full  disclosure  by  the  defendant.  The  courts  later  indicated  that  a 
merely low viral load would be sufficient. In Mabior, the Supreme Court seemed to turn its 
back on these rulings, stating that a defendant would have to use a condom and have a low or 
undetectable viral load.85 
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The clarity that a statutory defence would provide would also assure sufferers of the 
legal benefits of careful condom use. This should encourage greater condom use amongst 
sufferers, which would in turn further public health aims. Aside from total abstinence, the use 
of condoms is the best way to prevent the spread of HIV and other sexually transmissible 
diseases.86 On this note, the practicalities of adopting such a stance ought to be explored. 
What would this statute look like? In the main, it would merely need to stipulate that 
careful condom use or a low viral load could be used as a defence; the burden would be an 
evidential one. It should also state that the defendant must take the (reduced) risk with 
awareness; that is, he must be aware of the effect of his taking precautions. Regarding viral 
load, the statute should specifically require that the defendant be able to establish a low viral 
load, by medical evidence, throughout the period of time during which he was engaging in 
intercourse with his partner. A defence enshrined in statute may, after medical advancements, 
become full of omissions or caveats. For this reason, a mechanism should be included in the 
legislation that allows it to be updated in an effective and timely manner. One way to 
accomplish this would be to allow the Secretary of State  to enact new legislation as new 
circumstances arise. 87 For example, the law may someday want to recognise the type of 
sexual activity as a reasonable precaution that merits a defence, or there could be further 
advancements in antiretroviral therapies. 
In terms of whether the defence would operate as an excuse or as a justification, the 
authors contend that no justification should be found. It is clear that a defendant’s actions 
cannot be called justified when he has deliberately concealed his status as an HIV sufferer 
from his sexual partner. Fletcher captures the distinction nicely: 
[C]laims of justification concede that the definition of the offence is satisfied, but 
challenge  whether  the  act  is  wrongful;  claims  of  excuse  concede  that  the  act  is 
wrongful, but  seek to  avoid  the attribution of the act  to  the actor.  A justification 
speaks as to rightness of an act; an excuse as to whether the actor is accountable for a 
concededly wrongful act.88 
Justification therefore provides a much stronger form of exculpati on.  In  Hart’s  words,  a 
justification is given to conduct that ‘the law does not condemn or even welcomes’.89 Given 
this, it is clear that the use of precautions could only ever excuse the defendant’s actions; the 
                                                 
86 UNAIDS, UNFPA and WHO ‘Condoms and HIV Prevention: Position Statement by UNAIDS, UNFPA and 
WHO’  (UNAIDS,  19  March  2009)  <http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories 
/2009/march/20090319preventionposition> accessed 29 January 2015. 
87 Hughes (n 3) 149. 
88 George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little Brown 1978) 759. 
89 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (OUP 1968) 13. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
71 
state is never going to ‘welcome’ non-disclosure, even where precautions have been taken. 
The  state  may,  however,  be  prepared  to  concede  the  wrong  in  non-disclosure,  but 
nevertheless seek to avoid the attribution of blame on the basis of the defendant’s use of 
protection. Further support for reasonable precautions as an excuse comes from the deeds 
theory  of  justifiable  defences,90 under which a person does not need to be aware of the 
circumstances justifying his conduct for a justification, but for an excuse, needs to be aware 
of the availability of the defence.91 
Quite obviously, if a defendant is to rely on reasonable precautions as a defence, he 
should be consciously taking those steps to fulfil his legal and moral obligations to his 
partner. Indeed, in line with the reasoning from  R v Dadson,92 it would need to be insisted 
upon that reasonable precautions would not be an excuse, unless the defendant intentionally 
took those measures to protect his partner, and himself, at the time of the offence. Thus, the 
best option is for the law to recognise a ‘safer sex defence’93 that would excuse HIV sufferers 
who  engage  in  protected  intercourse  so  long  as  the  precautions  taken  are  medically 
reasonable in light of the nature of the infection. In view of these proposals, the duty upon 
HIV sufferers to disclose their status would inevitably undergo change. 
4.  A duty to disclose? 
What would become of the duty to disclose one’s status if reasonable precautions negated 
recklessness or operated as a defence? It has been inferred that the need for disclosure would 
be negated by the defendant’s taking precautions. Some extended discussion of this question 
is required, since it is at least arguable that whenever a risk, even a small risk, remains when 
reasonable precautions are used, the infected party ought still to have informed his sexual 
partner of his status.94 Support for this stance is easy to find.  There is a wealth of opinion 
questioning the morality of a stance that would allow infected parties to decide, on behalf of 
their sexual partner, the level of risk they are ul timately willing to accept. Ciccarone and 
others  argue  strongly  that  such  an  approach  would  be  “ethically  indefensible”.95 Bruner 
argues even more strongly still that: 
… powerful arguments can be made that withholding information about one’s HIV 
infection from a sex partner is morally disrespectful and treats the other as a means to 
                                                 
90 See Paul H Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press 1997) 101. 
91 JC Smith, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (Stevens, 1989) 28; See also Hughes (n 3) 137. 
92 (1850) 14 JP 754. 
93 Ryan (n 52) 233. 
94 Ryan (n 52) 235-236. 
95 DH Ciccarone and others, ‘Sex Without Disclosure of HIV Serostatus in a US Probability Sample of Persons 
Receiving Medical Care for HIV Infection’ (2003) 93 American Journal of Public Health 949, 953. The HIV Stigma: Duty or Defence? 
72 
one’s own end … rather than as a moral agent – a human being – who is entitled to 
make his or her own decisions about sexual risk.96 
Of course, the ideal is that all HIV sufferers would disclose their status to their sexual 
partners, and would feel comfortable doing so. But this is an ideal. Social preconceptions do 
not lend themselves to HIV sufferers being open and frank about their condition with others. 
As Judge LJ notes in  Dica, ‘there are significant negative consequences of disclosure of 
HIV’.97 Even cursory research into this reveals that non-disclosure is motivated by many 
varying  practical  and  emotional  reasons,  including  the  fear  of  prejudicial  reactions;  the 
possible admission of sexual infidelity, rape, or intravenous drug use; the potential breach of 
privacy if a sufferer’s status becomes fodder for gossip; and realistic fears of rejection or 
humiliation.98 
There is also the more serious fear that disclosure could turn vi olent if it results in a 
physical altercation. Given the potential gravity of these outcomes, it is clear that a decision 
as to the need for disclosure cannot be made in a vacuum. There needs to be a balancing of 
the difficulty of disclosure against the necessity for this where the risk has been substantially 
lowered by the defendant’s use of precautions. It seems that Grant has the right approach 
when she says that the criminal law should be reserved for the most egregious cases of non-
disclosure in the context of unprotected sex.99 Disclosure is inherently difficult and those 
taking reasonable precautions are making efforts to avoid transmission of the virus. 
The argument for disclosure despite precautions becomes even weaker when one 
considers the statistical probability of transmission when such measures are taken. For 
example, the Canadian AIDS Society considers unprotected anal and vaginal intercourse to 
be ‘high risk behaviours’ in terms of the likelihood of transmission, whereas it considers 
protected intercourse to be only ‘low risk’.100 Furthermore, the risk of transmission of HIV 
between heterosexual couples is reduced by up to 96% where the infected party is taking 
antiretroviral drugs. 
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In view of the low risk of infection where precautions are utilised, Bennett, Draper 
and Frith’s argument that ‘when the risk is low it is possible to act in a responsible and 
morally justifiable way without forewarning’ seems more plausible.101 They go on to argue 
that in a liberal society, the level of risk must surely be allowed to influence the obligation to 
forewarn others.102 This is directed specifically at comments made by Erin and Harris,  who 
advocate for an absolute duty to forewarn, largely on the basis of the (faulty) logic that all 
sexual relations with an infected party involve an absolute risk because HIV will eventually 
result  in  premature  death.103 Such an argument ignores science, 104 and ignores the actual 
behaviour of HIV sufferers. One study reveals that non -disclosure is often a considered 
choice where the risk is low, made where the sufferer is satisfied that as a result of that low 
risk, they are either not putting anyone at risk or are exposing them to a negligible risk 
only.105 
Two issues remain before the issue of disclosure can be laid to rest. The first i s the 
failure rate of condoms. Condoms have been reported as having a 20% failure rate, in light of 
the fact that they can fall off, break, or be used improperly. 106 The question then becomes 
which party should bear the risk of the condom failing. 107 One approach is to insist on 
disclosure so that the person at greatest risk can decide exactly what risks they are prepared to 
accept.108 The other is to accept the failure rate of condoms and to continue insisting on their 
use on the basis that, barring abstinence, condom use is the best known way to prevent HIV 
transmission.109 The authors favour the latter approach, given that the taking of precautions 
should, in principle, be easier than disclosure, and that this contributes towards the overall 
aim of preventing the spread of HIV.110 This strikes the appropriate balance that Ryan speaks 
of between the need to protect a sexual partner from exposure and the need to protect the 
person infected from the potentially negative consequences of disclosure.111 
The second issue is  whether allowing a defendant’s recklessness to be negated or 
excused will lead to greater recklessness in society as a whole. Wilson and others argue that 
‘the  risk  of  HIV  transmission  in  heterosexual  partnerships  in  the  presence  of  effective 
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treatment is low but non-zero and … if the claim of non-infectiousness in effectively treated 
patients  was  widely  accepted,  and  condom  use  subsequently  declined,  then  there  is  the 
potential for substantial increases in HIV incidence’.112 Unfortunately, some sufferers with a 
low viral load will probably be of the opinion that they no longer need to utilise condoms if a 
low load is enough to avoid criminal liability.113 However, the level of risk presented by such 
a person will be low enough that an increase in transmissions  will be unlikely. Furthermore, 
even though those with low viral loads may not feel that they need to use condoms to protect 
others because of the low risk, they would likely do so in order to protect themselves from 
other STIs that could, in turn, cause their viral load to change. 
It is true that a risk will always be present when a person engages in sexual activities 
with an HIV sufferer. But there is always a risk to sex  – if not of contracting HIV, then of 
contracting  another  disease,  or  of  becoming  pregnant.114 When a person with HIV takes 
reasonable precautions, the law should recognise that the sufferer has taken action to prevent 
the spread of the virus, and not punish them. An approach which places a higher degree of 
emphasis upon education and personal responsibility for one’s own body may prove more 
effective in improving the wellbeing of both the sufferer and the uninfected party than one 
which focuses on penalisation. 
 
D.  CONCLUSION 
There is  no doubt  that  the transmission of HIV is  a serious issue, and  that it should be 
handled in a fair and sensitive manner. The authors suggest that the most appropriate way to 
achieve this aim is the implementation of a model that places an equal level of responsibility 
on both the infected and the uninfected parties. Currently, a disproportionate duty is placed 
on  the  infected  party  to  forewarn  any  potential  sexual  partners  of  their  HIV  status.  The 
authors submit that there is a significant difference between sexual encounters with near-
strangers and sexual encounters that occur within committed, monogamous relationships. The 
reduction  of  the  duty  to  forewarn  where  no  significant  relationship  exists  could  prove 
effective in increasing awareness of the virus and may, in turn, encourage people to take a 
higher degree of responsibility for their bodies. 
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It is, however, recognised that a simple reduction of the sufferer’s duty to disclose may not, 
in itself, prove effective enough in reducing the criminal liability of the HIV sufferer. It is 
suggested that the defence of reasonable precautions outlined within this article would likely 
allow for a wider margin of flexibility where the disclosure of HIV is concerned. Providing 
that a defendant has taken reasonable precautions to prevent the spread of the virus, they 
arguably ought to be entitled to an excuse in the rare circumstances where the virus spreads in 
spite  of  preventative  measures  that  have  been  taken.  An  approach  of  this  nature  would 
provide clear guidelines for HIV sufferers, reducing the inequitable risk of criminalisation 
based on infection alone. Above all, it is submitted by the authors that the proposals outlined 
in this piece would be highly effective in reducing the stigma of HIV and in changing social 
attitudes for the better regarding transmission of the virus. 
 